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Abstract— This paper proposes a novel approach to System of 
Systems modelling based on the specification of system 
capabilities. The approach is designed to help end users 
graphically identify and analyse the hazards and associated 
risks that can arise in complex socio-technical System of 
Systems, with particular emphasis on the role of system 
dependencies. Through a case study this paper shows how the 
technique can identify the vulnerabilities that may arise within 
a given System of System configuration; and explore the 
resilience of a given system when considering evolution and 
unexpected circumstances. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
System of System (SoS) engineering represents a rapidly 
evolving research area designed to deal with a number of 
pressing issues within traditional systems development: 
• Increasing system complexity. 
• The integration of legacy applications / processes. 
• The drive for greater business agility (the creation 
of short term ad-hoc collaborations of systems in 
particular) 
• The growth of trans-organisational systems which 
operate through the utilisation of multiple 
independent agencies. 
SoS engineering provides one approach to dealing with 
these issues, albeit at the cost of some degree of control and 
potentially increased system vulnerability. This paper argues 
that many high level vulnerabilities can be managed through 
appropriate SoS modelling, analysis and discussion. For the 
purposes of this paper we define a SoS as: 
A collection of systems both technical and socio-
technical which pool their abilities to present a more 
complex system, whilst retaining their individual 
autonomy. 
The main defining characteristics of SoS are that they 
are not necessarily subject to centralised control, relying 
instead on their own internal organisational hierarchy to 
manage operations, and in many cases their own evolution. 
This in particular can introduce vulnerabilities within a 
given SoS as changes to systems affect those dependent on 
them. Within an ad-hoc SoS it may be possible for 
individual systems to find a deficiency with regard to their 
SoS, and bring in additional member systems without 
necessarily discussing the issue with other SoS members. 
As such vulnerability is introduced through a lack of 
visibility between systems. 
The main body of systems engineering focuses primarily 
on managing development within traditional organisational 
boundaries, with considerable emphasis on centralised 
control of management and evolution. While techniques 
such as outsourcing have become a common phenomenon 
within systems engineering to deal with increasing system 
complexity and cost, they rely on one party controlling the 
interaction, and are an insufficient abstraction alone to cover 
the way in which complex systems such as the NHS 
operate.  
In addition much of the existing SoS engineering 
research relies on organisations cooperating in the 
construction of a SoS [1],[2], something which this paper 
argues cannot be taken for granted when involving systems 
with overlapping and potentially competing interests. Part of 
this problem stems from the emergence of SoS, initially 
from the domain of military systems [3],[4], where the 
rigidity of control and common purpose simplifies issues.  
Many SoS will be ad-hoc, potentially temporary 
amalgamations of systems which may not be aware of each 
other despite contributing towards common SoS goals. In 
these situations a heavyweight analysis using a more 
traditional means of vulnerability analysis would be 
complicated, costly, and depend upon highly trained 
investigators. The technique put forward in this paper is 
designed to enable the end users themselves to identify, 
analyse and discuss issues within a structured modelling 
framework that can be picked up with minimal training. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 
discusses existing modelling techniques that are either used 
for SoS modelling or have a bearing on Socio-technical 
system analysis. Section 3 introduces a case study based on 
the NHS NPfiT program (National Program for Information 
Technology in the NHS), which is then used as a running 
example throughout the remaining sections of the paper. 
Section 4 shows how capabilities and dependencies can be 
used to provide sufficient structure to form the basis for 
vulnerability analysis. Section 5 shows how a cut down 
version of HAZOPs can be used to explore the potential 
hazards and risks associated with identified vulnerabilities. 
Section 6 briefly explores the role of tooling within the 
approach. Finally section 7 highlights future areas of 
research and draws conclusions.   
II. SOS MODELLING BACKGROUND 
The modelling of SoS architectures is still in its infancy. 
Traditional approaches alone are insufficient in this area, 
partly due to the way in which such systems are being 
developed, or in many cases simply appearing in ad-hoc 
form. Traditional systems engineering methods for example 
rarely lead to systems containing different competing 
capabilities, or the level of autonomy in terms of evolution 
routinely seen in SoS development. Although work in the 
area of SoS modelling can be traced back to the late 1990s 
[5] the focus has been predominantly on understanding the 
interactions between technical systems. This represents a 
logical attempt to extend software component based 
methodologies and modelling tools such as UML to 
describe wider technical system interactions within SoS [6].  
Architectural frameworks such as MODAF [7] with its 6 
different viewpoints (Technical, Strategic, Operational, 
Service, System & acquisition) and over 30 different 
individual view diagram types represents an in depth 
modelling approach which requires significant resources, in 
terms of both personnel and time. Despite being put forward 
as a potential SoS modelling technique it focuses on 
technical rather than socio-technical concerns.  It can be 
argued that approaches such as MODAF rely on a level of 
specification that may not be attainable in evolving SoS. It 
is important to note that the definition of the term capability 
within MODAF differs from that of this paper in that 
MODAF defines a capability as something you may not be 
able to currently achieve, but can aim towards in the future; 
whereas our approach instead focuses on what organisations 
can currently achieve using the resources at their disposal.  
TOGAF [8] is another such enterprise framework which 
can be used in the design and implementation of SoS. 
However given its emphasis on the construction of SoS it is 
of little use when considering existing or ad-hoc evolution 
of SoS configurations. The approach this paper puts forward 
is therefore one complementary to the techniques that may 
be used in the construction of a SoS. 
In terms of supporting tools for SoS evolution, products 
such as HP Universal CMDB are an attempt to enable 
system administrators to maintain a coherent view of the 
dependencies present in technical systems within a larger 
SoS. However, in doing so they only support technical 
systems implementing their own companies’ software. 
Setting aside the need to describe SoS's combining 
heterogeneous products, although they are capable of 
significant depth current tools fall down in supporting the 
human / organisational side of the SoS.  
In particular this research aims to address discussions on 
a number of key factors for the successful deployment and 
management of SoS: 
 
• The risks associated with a given SoS configuration. 
• Seeking to gauge the volatility of the SoS. 
• Supporting the design and ongoing evolution of the 
SoS. 
 
We have shown in the past that techniques such as 
Responsibility modelling are useful abstractions for 
discussing socio-technical issues within individual systems 
[9],[10],[11]. Responsibility modelling is a graphical 
modelling technique designed to allow end users to model 
and explore many of the high level risks within their socio-
technical systems without recourse to expensive risk 
management specialists. As such responsibility modelling is 
designed to focus on a relatively abstract model of the 
socio-technical system, containing the minimum 
information required from end users to aid in problem 
identification and analysis. It is this type of pared down 
modelling that we put forward for SoS; within SoS much of 
the more detailed information about how systems operate 
would not be known to those constructing and maintaining 
the wider SoS. However, we cannot simply apply our 
existing notation to SoS modelling. It is not appropriate to 
use the unifying concept of a responsibility to describe SoS 
primarily because: 
• A system could be entirely technical, making 
responsibility of the system an inappropriate 
concept (The idea of a technical component being 
truly responsible in the human sense is controversial 
and considered untenable within this paper). 
• It is plausible that an individual system within an 
SoS may not be considered responsible for a given 
task. The concept of SoS does not state that those 
participating systems have to be aware of, or 
accountable for the “bigger picture”. 
• Individual systems within a wider SoS are not 
necessarily transparent in how they operate, 
preventing responsibility from being applied to 
anything other than the system itself.  
This paper argues that the term capability is a more 
appropriate abstraction than responsibility when considering 
system interactions. For the purposes of this paper the 
definition of a capability is: 
 
The ability to provide some expertise relevant to the 
wider needs of an SoS 
 
A capability may be independent, or may be depended 
upon by other systems or the capabilities they put forward 
into a SoS.  A capability does not necessarily imply 
accountability or usage, and may be subject to operational 
and environmental constraints. For example: 
• System X is capable of providing web support 
• System Y is capable of maintaining a website 
There are some research papers exploring the use of 
capabilities within systems engineering including [12], 
however the authors here focus on applying capabilities to 
Requirements Engineering for lengthy system 
developments, rather than ongoing risk analysis within an 
SoS by a systems users. 
To summarise the position of this paper we advocate the 
use of Responsibility modelling within systems for risk 
analysis (where more detailed information is available), and 
Capability modelling between systems of an SoS (where 
information is likely to be more scarce). The approach 
outlined in this paper provides a graphical notation focusing 
on; capabilities, and their associated dependencies and 
vulnerabilities. It does not compete directly with existing 
modelling notations given its emphasis on ongoing SoS 
management from a user perspective, but instead seeks to 
complement approaches, including responsibility modelling 
that focus on risk management within individual socio-
technical systems. The following section is split to consider 
each of these, alongside a running example from an existing 
case study based on the NHS Spine. 
III. CASE STUDY OVERVIEW 
The NPfiT project is one of the most ambitious and 
complex system procurement programmes ever attempted. It 
is a project that has been running for a number of years, in 
which time new systems have been added, others made 
obsolete. It encompasses the replacement of hundreds of 
systems individual to GPs, Hospitals and Pharmacies with 
connected provisioning to allow information dissemination 
and sharing across a new dedicated NHS network (the 
Spine). The scope of the remit is such that many of the 
systems being developed would within other contexts be 
considered large scale complex systems in themselves.  
There has been considerable controversy regarding the 
way in which systems have been procured and paid for 
within the NHS, including a well publicised special issue of 
the Journal of information technology [13] during 2007. 
One of the general issues relating to NPfiT was that of the 
lack of socio-technical focus, given that the systems would 
provide generic replacement facilities to those currently 
operating proprietary local systems customised to their 
individual needs [14],[15]. The notations used within this 
paper are designed not to impose an increasing artificial 
separation between technical systems and their operators, 
and instead explores on the effect human operators have as 
part of a combined socio-technical system. 
The systems within the programme represent a large 
scale SoS in that all the systems are relatively autonomous 
(though many require the capability to intercommunicate 
with others, or to make use of fixed or shared resources). 
The systems themselves are being developed by a number of 
different companies, and will be deployed within subsets of 
the NHS, as well as organisations outside its immediate 
control including GPs and pharmacies. Keeping track of the 
system at a high level is something of a challenge here due 
to the number of organisations involved, and the complexity 
of operations within them. Ultimately however each of the 
systems has a purpose, and makes available certain 
capabilities to the wider system. Each of the systems 
themselves are also dependent on each other, many of them 
with respect to the TMS (Transaction and Messaging Spine) 
which provides the communications backbone to many of 
the systems. It is infeasible to understand the internal 
structure of all of these systems in order to manage high 
level risks. A considerable number of vulnerabilities can in 
fact be mitigated with dependency information from a 
relatively abstract level. In addition, the recognition of 
system capabilities, especially in a situation such as this 
where the system itself is continually changing, can be used 
to quickly identify options for increased system 
dependability in the form of fallback options, redundancy 
etc. The examples used throughout the paper to illustrate 
how the approach works are drawn from this domain. 
IV. CAPABILITY SPECIFICATION 
These are the capabilities that a given system puts into a 
SoS. They can be broken down by type and maturity, 
though indication of capability maturity does not necessarily 
mean it is in fact in use / not in use within a given SoS at a 
given point in time. Within the notation the current use 
within an SoS of a capability may be denoted by a heavier 
line than that used for unused capabilities. In this way the 
modelling can be used to provide a snapshot of the current 
operation of a SoS. As well as the provision of a capability 
to a given system, different capabilities and indeed the 
systems themselves may rely upon each other through high 
level dependencies.  
 
Capability Maturity 
  
• Current 
A current capability is one which is considered both 
maintained and available for use within a reasonable 
time-frame (information on which would be stored 
within the meta-data for a given capability). It does 
not imply that a given capability is static in terms of 
evolution, or that it will always be available, merely 
that it meets the minimum standards set out to 
achieve the goals of the SoS. 
• Legacy 
A legacy capability is one which has formed an 
integral part of the SoS in the past but is no longer 
the preferred method of performing an operation. It 
may not be maintained to the same levels, if at all, 
as that of a current capability. Technical systems in 
particular may retain the capability to perform tasks 
past the time which they are required to do so. 
Organisational procedures are decommissioned, but 
the training and knowledge held by those involved 
is retained into the future in a context dependently 
decreasing manner. There are numerous examples 
of this type of behaviour in the real world: 
o The re-activation of Vulcan bomber refuelling 
for the Falklands conflict of 1981.  
o The retaining by many shops of “zip-zap” 
manual credit card imprinters as an ultimate 
fall-back position despite the fact that they 
have not been in widespread use for decades 
[16]. 
o From within university administration, in 
many departments the position of Head of 
School is transitory, changing at regular 
periods, however in the absence of a given 
Head of School realistically it may make more 
sense to ask a previous Head of School for 
advice than not to seek advice at all. 
Legacy capability use is not without its risks or 
indeed costs, but could potentially increase the 
dependability of a given system. Legacy capabilities 
have specific training requirements for personnel if 
they are to be retained in a meaningful way for any 
length of time. For technical systems there may be 
sizeable risks related to both throughput and 
compatibility. However, these capabilities represent 
the history of the SoS, something which needs to be 
documented and may be called upon when 
required. 
• Development 
Development capabilities denote the future of the 
SoS in that they document those capabilities it will 
have in the future (how far in the future is 
something you would expect to be denoted within 
the capabilities meta-data).  They may introduce 
new hazards into a given SoS, as well as remove old 
ones. 
 
Capability types 
 
Capability types are broken down based on their 
characteristics into the following categories: 
 
• Technical (denoted T in the notation) 
Technical capabilities allow systems to expose 
artefacts to the wider system. These could include: 
o Applications / Services 
o OS / Platforms 
o Networks 
o Physical resources such as pc’s  
• Socio-technical Resources (denoted ST in the 
notation)  
Socio-technical capabilities provide resources 
involving both technical and organisational 
elements. For example a capability to process 
expense claims could involve both an accounting 
person for authorisation and checking, and a 
technical component to provide long term storage 
of data.  
Figure 1: Network provisioning 
 
• Manual (denoted M in the notation) 
Manual processes involve no technical systems. 
Decision making for example may rely entirely on 
a given human agent. 
• Information Resources (denoted I in the notation) 
An information capability implies that information 
is provided by a given system, and may be utilised 
by other systems or individually exposed 
capabilities.  
• Personnel Resources (denoted P in the notation) 
Some organisational units provide people for use in 
the provisioning of other systems or individual 
capabilities. For example a motor pool may 
provide drivers. This separates the person from 
system. A person has training, and can do a great 
many things but they are not a system. The training 
of personnel for given systems is often not 
performed by those actually using the system but 
by specific training personnel. 
Dependent on the type of capability different types of 
vulnerability may occur. Entirely technical systems rarely 
display the same level of dependability when faced with 
unexpected circumstances that socio-technical or manual 
human based ones do, due to their deterministic nature. 
However technical systems do not suffer from fatigue and 
are more predictable in dangerous situations. Information 
resources are unusual in that unlike technical and socio-
technical interactions an information resource cannot be 
exhausted. 
Capabilities may be of limited lifespan if the system 
itself has a date for decommissioning etc. By collating this 
type of meta-data the modeller can seek to gauge the 
volatility of the SoS, and show its progression in terms of 
systems evolution.  
Figure 1 illustrates the capability approach using an 
example from the NPfiT programme. A single legacy 
system has been used in the example, though many others 
exist in the wider SoS. It shows the capabilities (illustrated 
using ellipses) of three different communication network 
systems (illustrated using rectangles) in use within the NHS. 
The N3 network, and TMS delivered through the new NHS 
Spine project can both supply data transfer capabilities. The 
relationship between the spine and TMS is illustrated using 
a decomposition arrow. This allows systems to be 
decomposed into sub systems as necessary. In actuality the 
type of data transfer they support differs in that the new 
TMS system can deliver data in a more secure manner than 
N3, but the essence of the diagram is that there are two 
current viable ways of transmitting data. The NHS 
Lincolnshire IT Network is a parallel and separate system 
which is superseded by TMS. Where TMS and N3 provide 
training for use of their systems in addition to access itself 
the Lincolnshire system is no longer actively used, and is 
awaiting decommissioning or, in this case evolution into a 
new network (COIN).  Based purely on capability it appears 
the dependability of the system rests on the two current 
systems and the possible use of the backup Lincolnshire 
system, though in the case of this system it would be 
geographically constrained. In order to understand how 
these systems contribute to the wider systems dependability 
it is necessary to consider what dependencies they have. 
V. DEPENDENCIES 
These relate to inter-system and environmental 
dependencies. If a given system provides a capability to the 
wider SoS it is possible that other capabilities will depend 
upon it. For example a system may provide a web service 
but will depend on another systems network to fulfil it. 
There are a number of identifiable types, which could be 
either uni-directional (a capability relies on the provisioning 
of another) or bi-directional (capabilities or systems relying 
on each other in order achieve a stable and useful SoS). 
In Figure 2 a current network dependency exists 
between N3 and TMS. This means that TMS cannot be 
relied upon in the event of N3 failure. We also see that there 
is no such dependability linking N3 to the legacy 
Lincolnshire network and can thus assume they are 
independent in terms of operation. 
This paper does not explore the use of scheduling 
dependencies, ie one capability being utilised before another 
or in parallel etc, as existing methods from the domain of 
workflow modelling, including UML event diagrams should 
be sufficient for use in SoS.  
To summarise, an arrow pointing away from a system to 
a capability indicates the exposure of a capability by that 
system. Arrows pointing towards systems / capabilities 
show dependencies. 
Figure 3 shows the way in which patient records are 
shared between sites. The preferred method relies on 
whether a given GP (General practitioners practice) is 
GP2GP system enabled or not. If it is then that GP can 
transfer records electronically using the secure data transfer 
capability of TMS. If it is not GP2GP enabled, although it 
has access to the same underlying network (N3) it cannot 
transfer records electronically (as doing so requires a secure 
connection), and so has to fall back on a legacy socio-
technical process. In this case the socio-technical process 
involves using a technical computer system to print patient 
records, or transfer to a CD, and then use a postal envelope 
(known colloquially as Lloyd George envelopes). The 
articles are then posted. On arrival at the destination GP data 
is re-entered into the system. Note that although a given GP 
Figure 2: Network dependency 
may be GP2GP enabled it needs to maintain the legacy 
mechanism, even though not the preferred mode of 
operation, in order to communicate with other GPs who are 
not GP2GP enabled.  
As you can see from the diagram a considerable amount 
of information can be conveyed using the minimum of 
capabilities and their associated dependencies, however 
additional meta data may be needed to interpret the 
diagrams.  As a guide the following information may 
commonly be associated with systems and capabilities 
• Organisational information relating to the structure 
in which the system is managed 
• Constraints on use. These may indicate 
resource/personnel limitations, or environmental 
concerns. 
• Training requirements 
• Information relating to the lifespan of the capability. 
If a given capability is only provided as a legacy 
alternative a decommissioning date may already 
have been set 
• Information regarding the steps necessary to 
reactivate legacy capabilities that are no longer in 
use may also be given. 
• Links to external documentation relevant to the 
capability 
• Personnel / Resources Interfaces. For example 
information relating to points of contact (if known). 
 
Figure 4 shows the type of information that may be 
associated with a given system/capability within the running 
example. With the addition of suitable meta information the 
diagrams themselves can then be used discursively to 
determine the high level vulnerabilities within the SoS.  
VI. VULNERABILITIES 
Vulnerability analysis is useful to ascertain the impact of 
deviation from the norm within the socio-technical 
structures modelled within a given SoS. The distinction 
between failure and success is unlikely to be clear cut within 
a socio-technical system. As such metrics such as MTTF, 
MTTR etc are of limited use. In these situations it is more 
Figure 3: A wider example 
appropriate to apply vulnerability analysis techniques 
similar to those used in Dependability Cases [17] or Safety 
Cases [18] for example, to illustrate the strength of the 
system from the perspective of its processes, training and 
management. Whilst applicable to both technical and socio-
technical systems, Dependability / Safety Cases require 
expert construction, an unreasonable approach when 
considering a rapidly evolving SoS. Instead a more 
simplistic but flexible type of analysis is required for the 
type of SoS’s envisioned (However, we believe 
Responsibility models could act as a pre-cursor to safety 
cases in more traditional system architectures; an idea 
explored further in section VIII).  This paper applies an 
adapted HAZOPs approach similar to that used with our 
previous work on responsibility modelling; designed to 
achieve much of the assurance provided by standard 
HAZOPs but less sensitive to incomplete information, and 
through the use of more limited generic categories of 
hazard. It is important to note that by adapting HAZOPs in 
this way some rigour is inevitably lost (essentially non 
experts are now performing a part analysis instead of 
experts comprehensively completing an analysis) but by 
doing so the approach can be used in more rapidly evolving 
situations such as SoS. The following shows the information 
used to construct an individual HAZOPs clause: 
 
• Target 
The provisioning of some capability or system 
• Keyword Hazard 
• Early 
A system / capability which is made available 
earlier than required may waste resources. 
• Late 
A system / capability which is only made 
available later than required could have a 
number of different consequences. For 
example the wider SoS may use a fallback 
legacy system, or may merely delay until the 
system is ready. 
• Unavailable 
A system  / capability which is unavailable 
could have considerable impact on a SoS if 
what has occurred is not quickly ascertained 
and potentially mitigated through the use of 
legacy capabilities  
• Incorrect 
If a system / capability supplies the wrong data 
to other systems that depend upon it cascade 
failures could occur across the SoS.  
• Insufficient 
The overloading of systems is a concern in 
SoS where the needs of the wider system are 
likely to change over time. The lack of 
centralised control may hamper the addition of 
provisioning to deal with increasing demands. 
One of the questions those modelling must 
therefore ask is what effect a lack of 
availability might have within the SoS. 
• Inefficient 
Legacy applications may prove more 
inefficient in terms of both the time and 
resources required for operation. By 
examining the dependencies different systems 
/ capabilities have it is possible to identify 
what would be affected by a slowdown in one 
part of the system 
• Risk  
We define risk in this context as a combination of 
the probability of the hazard occurring and the 
severity of the hazard. While probabilistic 
measurement would give the best basis for 
comparison and analysis they are likely to be 
beyond the capabilities of untrained users to either 
generate consistently or reason about. Instead 
qualitative statements are preferable as categories 
specific to a given domain can be formulated and 
applied in a more consistent manner. 
• Consequences  
Indicating what would or could occur next. These 
fields can be used to identify potential cascade 
failures. Part of this information is captured visually 
in that the dependencies between different 
capabilities implies certain impacts on failure, 
however the effect is not captured graphically and is 
instead captured under consequences. 
• Actions 
To indicate any mitigating actions that could be 
taken if this were to arise. For example would a 
legacy fall-back be brought in to cover the gap in 
capability?  
 
The HAZOPs style structure can then be applied to the 
individual capabilities / systems of the SoS. Dependent on 
the situation it may be possible to define some hazards 
applicable to an entire system, or it may require the 
specification of hazards to individual capabilities. For 
example in Figure 4 it does not make sense to list a 
HAZOPs clause stating the hazard associated with N3 being 
insufficient. Whilst at first glance this would appear to 
comment on the network availability, the system represents 
more than that one capability. A given socio-technical 
system encompasses people, processes etc. In this case in 
order to discuss vulnerabilities associated with the speed of 
the network for example it is necessary to write a HAZOPs 
clause for the appropriate broadband capability instead.  
Dependent on context and the type of capability explored 
the keywords used may vary. For example it makes little 
sense to discuss the vulnerabilities of network access 
through ‘broadband’ being available early; it is much more 
likely for vulnerabilities to be caused by ‘broadband’ being 
insufficient or unavailable.  
Table 1 outlines some of the HAZOPs clauses produced 
in the modelling of the example NHS SoS. The following 
points are drawn from the data put forward: 
• The failure of the spine TMS system would affect all 
spine TMS dependent systems, however it would not 
remove all network connectivity. In fact the main issue 
would be the loss of ‘secure data transfer’. Although 
not explored in Figure 4 many of the systems involved 
in this procurement were developed piecemeal. For 
some applications it may be possible to resort to N3 
unsecured communication. These could be shown as 
legacy capabilities on a diagram exploring the systems 
of the Spine, space unfortunately precludes the 
inclusion of this in the paper. 
• The failure of N3 would in effect start a cascade failure 
across the NHS systems. It would affect those systems 
dependent upon it in the first instance, for example the 
provisioning of broadband access. It would then affect 
the TMS systems capability to supply a secure network 
on the Spine (through the identified dependency) 
leading to the potential failure of all systems reliant 
upon it.  Cascade failures are straightforward to identify 
when using the hazard clause structure, as the affected 
systems are listed within the consequences of the 
clause. Supporting tools will in future be able to 
identify and track such changes merely by using 
identifiable tags to other capabilities / systems within 
the clauses. 
• Superficially the final clause should indicate the 
possibility to resort to legacy capability usage, ie if the 
network is running slowly then use manual processes. 
This however is not listed due to the context and related 
metadata relevant to the case. In a situation such as this 
it is necessary to explore the time taken to transfer data 
using a degraded service as opposed to the alternative, 
in this case using the postal service. Even in quite 
extreme situations it is unlikely that the transfer of 
small amounts of data would be more quickly achieved 
in this way. Some legacy capabilities therefore are more 
likely to be used only in the event of catastrophic 
failure due to the time, resources etc involved. 
VII. DEVELOPMENT OF TOOLS FOR EVALUATION 
 
The techniques outlined within this paper make use of 
meta information to convey additional details regarding 
constraints etc that are not visually associated with the 
diagrams. Tool support is required in order to link and 
manage the data involved in an efficient and above all, user 
friendly manner. The figures used within this paper were 
generated using a prototype tool based within Microsoft 
Visio, which is designed to allow users to quickly create 
templates and design interfaces to access meta information 
regarding both entities and relationships. 
VIII. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSIONS 
In summary this paper has outlined an approach to SoS 
modelling based around a given systems capabilities and 
dependencies, to which hazard analysis can then be applied.  
In the future we will explore the effect trust has on the 
Table 1: HAZOPs Clauses 
Figure 4: Meta Data example 
efficiency and complexity of systems. For example does a 
lack of trust lead to additional checks on input, and what 
effect does this have on the wider efficiency of the SoS.  
We are also in the process of exploring how our existing 
modeling and analysis techniques could mesh with existing 
safety / dependability assurance processes including those of 
safety cases. While our approach was designed to allow non 
experts to produce useful diagrams, it is possible that these 
could then act as valuable input when producing 
professional safety cases. In doing so the safety case 
constructor could reduce the number and type of questions 
they would need to ask of stakeholders. The process would 
also give stakeholders a better understanding of the system 
in which they operate, acting as preparatory material to 
understanding the safety case itself.  
REFERENCES 
 
[1] J. Hammond. Will it work. Proc 5th International Symposium on 
Requirements Engineering, RE01, 2001. ISBN: 0-7695-1125-2 
[2] G. Carlock, R.E. Fenton. System of Systems (SoS) Enterprise 
Systems Engineering for Information-Intensive Organizations. 
Journal of Systems Engineering, vol 4, no 4, 2001. John Wiley & 
Sons Inc. DOI: 10.1002 
[3] P. Redmond. A System of Systems Interface Hazard Analysis 
Technique. Msc Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey 
California. 
[4] S. Cook. On the acquisition of System of Systems. Proc  INCOSE 
2001. 
[5] J.S Osmundson, T.V Huynh. A Systems Engineering Methodology 
for Analyzing System of Systems. System of System Engineering 
Centre of Excellence 
[6] System Modelling Language (SysML) Specification v1.1, November 
2008. Object Management Group 
[7] MODAF Handbook, Technical Specification for MODAF. Ministry 
of Defence, 2005 
[8] TOGAF Version 9 Enterprise Edition.  The  Open Group. February 
2009 ISBN 9789087532307 
[9] R. Lock, T. Storer, I. Sommerville, G. Baxter. Responsibility 
Modelling for Risk Analysis. ESREL 2009. pp 1103-1109. ISBN: 
978-0-415-55509-8 
[10] I. Sommerville, T. Storer, R. Lock, Responsibility Modelling for 
Civil Emergency Planning. Palgrave Macmillan's, Risk Management, 
awaiting publication 2009. DOI:10.1057/rm.2009.11 
[11] I. Sommerville, R. Lock, T. Storer, J. Dobson. Deriving information 
requirements from responsibility models. Advanced Information 
Systems Engineering, 21st International Conference, CAiSE 2009. 
ISBN 978-3-642-02143-5 
[12] R. Ravichandar, J.D. Arthur, S.A. Bohner. 40th Annual Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences HICSS'07,  ISBN: 0-
7695-2755-8 
[13] Journal of Information Technology, Palgrave Macmillon. Volume 22, 
issue 3, september 2007 
[14] C. Clegg, C Shepherd. ‘The biggest computer programme in the 
world…ever!’: Time for a change in mindset? Journal of Information 
Technology, Palgrave Macmillon. Volume 22, issue 3 pp. 212-
221(10), september 2007. DOI 10.1057 
[15] M. Peltu, K. Easen, C. Clegg. How a socio-technical approach can 
help NPfiT deliver better NHS care. Bayswater Institute, Socio-
technical Group report May 2008  
[16] D. Stearns. In Plastic We Trust: Dependability and the Visa Payment 
System. DIRCshop Conference 2006, Newcastle, UK 
[17] P.G. Bishop, R.E. Bloomfield. A Methodology for Safety Case 
Development, Safety-critical Systems Symposium (SSS 98), 
Birmingham, UK, Feb, 1998  
[18] R.E. Bloomfield, B. Littlewood, D. Wright. Confidence: Its Role in 
Dependability Cases for Risk Assessment, Proc International 
Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN-2007), 
pp338-346, 2007. ISBN: 0-7695-2855-4 
 
